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Abstract
When voter preferences are known in an incom-
plete (partial) manner, winner determination is
commonly treated as the identification of the neces-
sary and possible winners; these are the candidates
who win in all completions or at least one comple-
tion, respectively, of the partial voting profile. In
the case of a positional scoring rule, the winners
are the candidates who receive the maximal total
score from the voters. Yet, the outcome of an elec-
tion might go beyond the absolute winners to the
top-k winners, as in the case of committee selec-
tion, primaries of political parties, and ranking in
recruiting. We investigate the computational com-
plexity of determining the necessary and possible
top-k winners over partial voting profiles. Our re-
sults apply to general classes of positional scoring
rules and focus on the cases where k is given as part
of the input and where k is fixed.
1 Introduction
A central task in social choice is that of winner determi-
nation—how to aggregate the candidate preferences of vot-
ers to select the winner. Relevant scenarios may be polit-
ical elections, document rankings in search engines, hiring
dynamics in the job market, decision making in multiagent
systems, determination of outcomes in sports tournaments,
and so on [Brandt et al., 2016]. Different voting rules can be
adopted for this task. The computational social-choice com-
munity has studied in depth the family of the positional scor-
ing rules, where each voter assigns to each candidate a score
based on the candidate’s position in the voter’s ranking, and
then a winner is a candidate who receives the maximal sum of
scores. Famous instantiations of the positional scoring rules
include the plurality rule (where a winner is most frequently
ranked first), the veto rule (where a winner is least frequently
ranked last), their generalizations to t-approval and t-veto, re-
spectively, and the Borda rule (where the score is the actual
position in the reverse order).
The seminal work of Konczak and Lang [2005] has ad-
dressed the situation where voter preferences are expressed or
known in just a partial manner. The framework is based on the
notions of the necessary winners and possible winners, who
are the candidates that win in every completion, or at least one
completion, respectively, of the given partial preferences into
complete ones. More precisely, a voting profile consists of a
partial order for each voter, and a completion consists of a lin-
ear extension for each of the partial orders. Determining the
necessary and possible winners is computationally challeng-
ing since, conceptually, it involves reasoning about the entire
(exponential-size) space of such completions. The complex-
ity of these problems has been thoroughly studied in a series
of publications that established a full classification of a gen-
eral class of positional scoring rules (the “pure” scoring rules)
into tractable and intractable ones [Betzler and Dorn, 2010;
Xia and Conitzer, 2011; Baumeister and Rothe, 2012].
The outcome of an election often goes beyond the single
winner to the set of top-k winners. For example, the top-k
winners might be the elected parliament members, the entries
of the first page of the search engine, the job candidates to
recruit, and the finalists of a sports competition. In the case
of a positional scoring rule, the top-k winners are the can-
didates who receive the top scores (under some tie-breaking
mechanism) [Meir et al., 2008]. Adopting the framework of
Konczak and Lang [2005], in this paper we investigate the
computational complexity of determining the necessary and
possible top-k winners for incomplete voting profiles and po-
sitional scoring rules.
We show that the top-k variant makes the problems fun-
damentally harder than their top-1 counterparts (necessary
and possible winners) when k is given as input. For ex-
ample, it is known that detecting the possible winners is
NP-hard for every pure rule, with the exception of plu-
rality and veto where the problem is solvable in polyno-
mial time [Betzler and Dorn, 2010; Xia and Conitzer, 2011;
Baumeister and Rothe, 2012]; we show that in the case of
top-k, the problem is NP-hard for every pure rule, includ-
ing plurality and veto. Moreover, tractability of the necessary
winners does not extend to the necessary top-k winners: we
show that the detecting whether a candidate is necessarily a
top-k winner is coNP-complete for a quite general class of
positional scoring rules that include all of the aforementioned
ones. We also study the impact of fixing k and establish a
more positive picture: detecting the necessary top-k winners
is tractable (assuming that the scores are polynomial in the
number of candidates) and detecting the possible the top-k
winners is tractable for plurality and veto.
The concept of the top-k winners can be viewed as a
special case of multiwinner election that has been stud-
ied mostly in the context of committee selection. Var-
ious utilities have been studied for qualifying selected
committee, such as maximizing the number of vot-
ers with approved candidates [Aziz et al., 2015] and, in
that spirit, the Condorcet committees [Elkind et al., 2011;
Darmann, 2013], aiming at proportional representation via
frameworks such as Chamberlin and Courant’s [1983] and
Monroe’s [1995], and the satisfaction of fairness and diver-
sity constraints [Celis et al., 2018; Bredereck et al., 2018].
In the case of incomplete voter preferences, the general-
ization of the problem we study is that of detecting the nec-
essary and possible committee members. These are inter-
esting and challenging problems in all the variants of com-
mittee selection, and we leave them for future investiga-
tion. Note, however, that the problem of determining the
elected committee can be intractable even if the preferences
are complete [Procaccia et al., 2007; Procaccia et al., 2008;
Darmann, 2013; Skowron et al., 2015], in contrast to the top-
k winners. Yet, we show that our results imply the tractability
of determining whether a candidate set is a necessary or pos-
sible Condorcet committee in the case of the plurality and
veto rules. The problem of multiwinner determination for in-
complete votes has been studied by Lu and Boutilier [2013] in
a perspective different from the necessary and possible top-k
winners: find a committee that minimizes the maximum ob-
jection (or “regret”) over all possible completions.
2 Preliminaries
We begin with some notation and terminology.
Voting Profiles and Positional Scoring Rules. Let C =
{c1, . . . , cm} be the set of candidates (or alternatives) and
let V = {v1, . . . , vn} be the set of voters. A voting profile
T = (T1, . . . , Tn) consists of n linear orders on C, where
each Ti represents the ranking of C by vi.
A positional scoring rule r is a series {~sm}m∈N+ of
m-dimensional vectors ~sm = (~sm(1), . . . , ~sm(m)) where
~sm(1) ≥ · · · ≥ ~sm(m) and ~sm(1) > ~sm(m). We de-
note ~sm(j) by r(m, j). Some examples of positional scoring
rules include the plurality rule (1, 0, . . . , 0), the t-approval
rule (1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) that begins with t ones, the veto rule
(1, . . . , 1, 0), the t-veto rule that ends with t zeros, and the
Borda rule (m− 1,m− 2, . . . , 0).
Given a voting profile T = (T1, . . . , Tn), the score
s(Ti, c, r) that the voter vi contributes to the candidate c is
r(m, j) where j is the position of c in Ti. The score of c in T
is s(T, c, r) =
∑n
i=1 s(Ti, c, r) or simply s(T, c) if r is clear
from context. The winners (or co-winners) are the candidates
c with a maximal s(T, c).
We make standard assumptions about the positional scor-
ing rule r. We assume that r(m, i) is computable in polyno-
mial time inm. We also assume that the numbers in each ~sm
are co-prime (i.e., their greatest common divisor is one).
A positional scoring rule is pure if ~sm+1 is obtained from
~sm by inserting a score at some position, for allm > 1.
Partial Profiles. A partial voting profileP = (P1, . . . , Pn)
consists of n partial orders on set C of candidates, where each
Pi represents the incomplete preference of the voter vi. A
completion of P = (P1, . . . , Pn) is a complete voting profile
T = (T1, . . . , Tn) where each Ti is a completion (i.e., linear
extension) of the partial order Pi.
The problems of necessary winners and possible winners
were introduced by Konczak and Lang [2005]. Given a par-
tial voting profileP, a candidate c ∈ C is a necessary winner
if c is a winner in every completionT ofP, and c is a possible
winner if there exists a completion T of P where c is a win-
ner. The decision problems associated to a positional scoring
rule r are those of determining, given a partial profile P and
a candidate c, whether c is a necessary winner and whether c
is a possible winner. We denote these problems by NW and
PW, respectively. A classification of the complexity of these
problems has been established in a sequence of publications.
Theorem 1 (Classification Theo-
rem [Betzler and Dorn, 2010; Xia and Conitzer, 2011;
Baumeister and Rothe, 2012]). NW can be solved in polyno-
mial time for every positional scoring rule. PW is solvable
in polynomial time for plurality and veto; for all other pure
scoring rules, it is NP-complete.
In this paper, we aim towards generalizing the Classifica-
tion Theorem to determine the necessary and possible top-k
winners, as we formalize next.
Top-k Winners. In principle, a top-k winner is a candidate
that is ranked at one of the top k places with respect to the
sum of scores from the voters. However, for a precise defini-
tion, we need to reason about ties. One could adopt several
options for being on the top-k winners: (a) w.r.t. at least one
tie-breaking order; (b) w.r.t. every tie-breaking order; and (c)
w.r.t. a tie-breaking order given as input. For simplicity of
presentation, we adopt the third variation and assume that the
tie-breaking order is given as input. Nevertheless, all of our
results hold for all three variations.
Formally, let r be a positional scoring rule, C be a set of
candidates, T a voting profile, and ≻tie a tie breaker, which
is simply a linear order overC. Let RT be the linear order on
C that sorts the candidates lexicographically by their scores
and then by ≻tie; that is,
RT := {c1 > c2 : s(T, c1) > s(T, c2)}∪
{c1 > c2 : s(T, c1) = s(T, c2) ∧ c1≻tie c2} .
A candidate c is a top-k winner if the position of c in RT,
denoted by rank(T, c), is at most k. Note that a top-1 winner
is necessarily a winner, but a winner might not be a top-1
winner due to tie breaking.
If T is replaced with a partial voting profileP, then a can-
didate c is a necessary top-k winner if c is a top-k winner in
every completion T of P, and a possible top-k winner if c is
a top-k winner in at least one completionT of P. Hence, for
a positional scoring rule r, we have two computational prob-
lems where the input consists of a candidate set C, a partial
profile P, a tie breaker ≻tie, a candidate c and a number k:
• In NTW, the goal is to determine whether c is a neces-
sary top-k winner.
• In PTW, the goal is to determine whether c is a possible
top-k winner.
We will also consider the versions where k is fixed,
and then denote it by parameterizing the problem with k:
NTW〈k〉 and PTW〈k〉
Additional Notation. We use the following notation. For a
set A and a partition A1, . . . , At of A:
• P (A1, . . . , At) denotes the partitioned partial order
P (A1, . . . , At) := {a1 ≻ · · · ≻ at : ∀i ∈ [t], ai ∈ Ai}.
• O(A1, . . . , At) denotes an arbitrary linear order on A
that completes P (A1, . . . , At).
A linear order a1 ≻ · · · ≻ at is also denoted as a vector
(a1, . . . , at). The concatenation (a1, . . . , at) ◦ (b1, . . . , bℓ) is
(a1, . . . , at, b1, . . . , bℓ).
3 Hardness of Top-k Winners
We first show that the problems we study are computationally
hard for quite general classes of positional scoring rules.
3.1 Plurality and Veto
The following theorems state the hardness for the plurality
and veto rules where both NW and PW are solvable in poly-
nomial time (according to the Classification Theorem).
Theorem 2. For the plurality rule, NTW is coNP-complete
and PTW is NP-complete.
Proof. Memberships in the corresponding classes (coNP and
NP) are straightforward, so we prove only hardness. We show
a reduction for each of the two problems.
NTW: We show a reduction from exact cover by-3sets
(X3C), which is the following decision problem: Given a ver-
tex set U = {u1, . . . , u3q} and a collection E of 3-element
subsets of U , can we cover all the elements of U using q
pairwise-disjoint sets from E? For u ∈ U , denote by E(u)
the set {e ∈ E : u ∈ e} of edges incident to u.
Given U and E, we construct an instance (C,P,≻tie) of
NTW under the plurality rule where C = E ∪ {c∗}, where
≻tie = O(E, {c
∗}), and where P is the partial voting profile
(P1, . . . , P3q, T3q+1, T3q+2, T3q+3). For every i ∈ [3q],
Pi = P (E(u), E \ E(u), {c
∗}) .
This means that the ith voter can vote only for edges that
cover ui. For i > 3q the order is Ti = O({c
∗} , E). To
complete, we show that there is an exact cover if and only if
c∗ is not a necessary top-q winner.
Suppose that c∗ is not a necessary top-q winner, that is,
there are q candidates ei1 , . . . , eiq and a completion T of P
such that s(T, eij ) ≥ s(T, c
∗) = 3 for all j ∈ [q]. Since ev-
ery edge can get at most three votes, we get that s(T, eij ) = 3
for every j ∈ [q]. Therefore ei1 , . . . , eiq is an exact cover: ev-
ery vertex ui is covered by the edge that Pi voted for, and the
edges are pairwise disjoint (since, if two edges are overlap-
ping, then one gets at most two votes).
Conversely, given an X3C solution Q =
{
ei1 , . . . , eiq
}
define a profile T = (T1, . . . , T3q+3) such that for every i ∈
[3q] we have
Ti = O(Q ∩E(ui), E(ui) \Q,E \ E(ui), {c
∗}) .
Every Ti extends Pi, for all e ∈ Q we have s(T, e) = 3, and
s(T, c∗) = 3. Hence, all edges in Q defeat c∗, and c∗ is a not
a top-q winner in T.
PTW: We use a reduction from the dominating set prob-
lem, which is the following: Given an undirected graph
G = (U,E) and an integer k, is there a set D ⊆ U of size k
such that every vertex is either in D or adjacent to some ver-
tex in D? Given a graph (U,E) with U = {u1, . . . , un}, we
construct an instance (C,P,≻tie) for PTW under plurality
where C = U ∪ {c∗}, where ≻tie = O({c
∗} , U), and where
P = (P1, . . . , Pn). LetN(ui) be the set of neighbours of ui,
and letN(ui)
∗ = N(ui) ∪ {ui}. For all i ∈ [n] we have
Pi := P (N(ui)
∗, U \N(ui)
∗, {c∗}) .
Hence, the ith voter can vote only for vertices that dominate
ui. To complete, we show that the graph has a dominating set
of size k if and only if c∗ is a possible top-k winner.
Suppose there is a dominating setD of size k, consider the
profile T = (T1, . . . , Tn) where for every i ∈ [n],
Ti := O(N(ui)
∗ ∩D,N(ui)
∗ \D,U \N(ui)
∗, {c∗}) .
In this completion, for each u /∈ D we get s(T, u) = 0.
These are n − k candidates that c∗ defeats, therefore c∗ is a
possible top-k winner. Conversely, if c∗ is a possible top-k
winner then in some completion T it defeats at least n − k
candidates, and these candidates have a score 0 in T. Let D
be the set of candidates that c∗ does not defeat inT, all voters
voted for candidates in D and |D| ≤ k. A voter Pi can only
vote for vertices which dominate ui, henceD is a dominating
set of size at most k.
Next, we show the hardness of NTW and PTW beyond
the plurality rule. Given a binary positional scoring rule r,
we define the complementary-reversed scoring rule, denoted
rR, to be the one given by rR(m, i) = 1− r(m,m + 1− i).
For example, the complementary-reversed rule of plurality is
veto, and more generally, the complementary-reversed rule of
t-approval is t-veto.
Lemma 1. For every binary positional scoring rule r, there
is a reduction
1. from NTW for r to the complement of PTW for rR;
2. from PTW for r to the complement of NTW for rR.
Proof. For a partial order Pi, the reversed order is defined by
PRi := {x ≻ y : (y ≻ x) ∈ Pi}. Note that Ti extends Pi if
and only if TRi extends P
R
i .
Given (C,P,≻tie) as input under r withP = (P1, ..., Pn),
consider (C,P′,≻tie
R) under rR where P′ = (PR1 , ..., P
R
n ).
LetT = (T1, ..., Tn) be a completion ofP, observe the com-
pletion T′ = (TR1 , ..., T
R
n ) of P
′. For every candidate c and
a voter vi we get s(T
R
i , c, r
R) = 1 − s(Ti, c, r) so overall
s(T′, c, rR) = n− s(T, c, r). Since the tie-breaking order is
also reversed, it holds that rank(T′, c) = m+1−rank(T, c)
for every c ∈ C. In same way, if T′ is a completion of P′
then by reversing the orders we get a completionT ofP such
that rank(T, c) = m+ 1− rank(T′, c) for every c ∈ C. We
can deduce that for any candidate c and integer k,
1. c is not a necessary top-k winner w.r.t (C,P,≻tie)
and r (there exists a completion T of P such that
rank(T, c) > k) if and only if c is a possible top-(m−k)
winner w.r.t (C,P′,≻tie
R) and rR (there exists a com-
pletionT′ of P′ such that rank(T′, c) ≤ m+ 1− k).
2. c is a possible top-k winner w.r.t (C,P,≻tie) and
r (there exists a completion T of P such that
rank(T, c) ≤ k) if and only if c is not a necessary top-
(m− k) winner w.r.t (C,P′,≻tie
R) and rR (there exists
a completionT′ of P′ such that rank(T′, c) > m− k).
From the above two points we conclude the two parts of the
lemma, respectively.
Combining Lemma 1 and Theorem 2, we conclude that:
Theorem 3. For the veto rule, NTW is coNP-complete and
PTW is NP-complete.
3.2 Beyond Plurality and Veto
What about positional scoring rules other than plurality and
veto? For any other pure positional scoring rule, PW is NP-
complete by the Classification Theorem, so PTW is also NP-
complete (by choosing k = 1). Combining this observation
with Theorems 2 and 3, we conclude that:
Corollary 1. PTW is NP-complete for every pure positional
scoring rule.
While we do not have a full classification for NTW, we
show the hardness of NTW under general conditions that in-
clude the commonly studied rules. First, we can deduce hard-
ness for every pure positional scoring rule with binary scores.
We already established hardness for plurality and veto in The-
orems 2 and 3. For any other rule r in this class, PW is NP-
complete for rR (by the Classification Theorem), so a small
change in the proof of Lemma 1 shows that NTW is coNP-
complete for r. We conclude that:
Corollary 2. NTW is coNP-complete for every pure posi-
tional scoring rules with binary scores.
To discuss rules with scores beyond binary, we define
the class of polynomially frequent scoring rules where some
score occurs frequently in the scoring vector. All commonly
studied rules fall under this definition, except for Borda.
Definition 1. A positional scoring rule r is polynomially fre-
quent if there exists a score x and a constant ε > 0 such that
| {i : r(m, i) = x} | = Ω(mε).
Examples of polynomially frequent rules include t-
approval (where x = 0) and t-veto (where x =
1). Another rule is (2, 1, . . . , 1, 0) that has been stud-
ied in depth [Baumeister et al., 2011]. This class strictly
generalizes that of the almost constant scoring rules
that has also been studied in the context of the com-
plexity of winner determination [Kimelfeld et al., 2018;
Kenig and Kimelfeld, 2019].
We will prove that NTW is hard for all pure polynomially
frequent scoring rules. For that, we need a definition and a
lemma. Let r and r′ be two positional scoring rules. We
say that r′ polynomially contains r if there exist a polynomial
p(m), an index im ≤ p(m) −m and two numbers am > 0
and bm such that r(m, j) = am · r
′(p(m), im + j) + bm
for all m, j ∈ [m]. For instance, t-approval polynomially
contains plurality for every fixed t, by choosing p(m) = m+
t − 1, im = t − 1, am = 1 and bm = 0. Similarly, t-veto
polynomially contains veto.
Lemma 2. Let r and r′ be two positional scoring rules. If r′
polynomially contains r, then there is a reduction
1. from NTW for r to NTW for r′;
2. from PTW for r to PTW for r′.
Proof. Let p(m), im, am, and bm be the functions that real-
ize the polynomial containment. Given (C,P,≻tie) as in-
put under r with P = (P1, . . . , Pn), consider the input
(C′,P′,≻′
tie
) under r′ where:
• C′ = C ∪ D1 ∪ D2 where D1 and D2 are disjoint sets
of new candidates with |D1| = im and |D2| = p(m) −
im −m. Note that |C
′| = p(m).
• P′ = (P ′1, . . . , P
′
n) where, in each P
′
j , the im highest-
ranked candidates are the ones ofD1, the p(m)−im−m
lowest-ranked candidates are the ones of D2, and be-
tweenD1 andD2 the candidates of C are the same as in
Pj . In our notation, P
′
j := Pj ∪ P (D1, C,D2).
• In ≻′
tie
, the im highest-ranked candidates are the ones of
D1, the p(m) − im − m lowest-ranked candidates are
the ones of D2, and between D1 and D2 the candidates
of C are the same as in ≻tie. In our notation, ≻
′
tie
=
O(D1) ◦ ≻tie ◦O(D2).
Let T = (T1, . . . , Tn) be a completion of P. Observe the
completion T′ = (T ′1, . . . , T
′
n) of P
′ where T ′j = O(D1) ◦
Tj ◦ O(D2). Since r
′ polynomially contains in r, for every
c ∈ C we get that
s(T′, c, r′) =
n∑
j=1
s(T ′j , c, r
′) =
n∑
j=1
am · s(Tj , c, r) + bm
= am · s(T, c, r) + nbm .
Hence, by the definition of ≻′
tie
, the positions of the candi-
dates satisfy rank(T′, c) = rank(T, c) + im. Conversely,
let T′ be a completion of P′. Every T ′j has to be of the
form O(D1) ◦O(C) ◦O(D2), so removingD1 andD2 from
all the linear orders gives a completion T of P such that
rank(T, c) = rank(T′, c) − im for all c ∈ C. We con-
clude that for all c ∈ C and k it holds that c is a necessary
(resp., possible) top-k winner w.r.t. (C,P,≻tie) and r if and
only if c is a necessary (resp., possible) top-(k + im) winner
w.r.t. (C′,P′,≻′
tie
) and r′.
Note that Lemma 2 can be applied for non-pure rules, so
the second item can be used for rules not covered by Corol-
lary 1. Consequently, we get the following general hardness.
Theorem 4. NTW is coNP-complete for every pure polyno-
mially frequent scoring rule.
Proof. Let r be a pure polynomially frequent scoring rule,
and denote r by {~sm}m>1. Let m
′ be the minimal m where
x occurs in ~sm, and let j be the index of x in ~sm′ . First, con-
sider the case where j > 1, which means that ~sm′ contains
both x and a score greater than x. Since the rule is pure we
can deduce that for every m ≥ m′, ~sm also contains both
x and a score greater than x. Then, there exists some score
ym > x such that ~sO(m1/ε) contains the vector (ym, x, . . . , x)
of length m + 1. Choosing p(m) = O(m1/ε), im as the
biggest index of ym, am = ym − x and bm = x shows that,
in this case, r polynomially contains plurality. The hardness
results then follow from Theorem 2 and Lemma 2. Now con-
sider the case where j = 1, hence for every m ≥ m′, ~sm
contains both x and a score smaller than x (since the rule
is pure). Then, there exist some score ym < x such that
~sO(m1/ε) contains the vector (x, . . . , x, ym) of lengthm+ 1.
Choosing p(m) = O(m1/ε), im as the smallest index of x,
am = x − ym, bm = ym shows that in this case r polyno-
mially contains veto. Hardness for r then follows from The-
orem 3 and Lemma 2.
To complete the picture, we are still missing the complexity
of the top-k winners for the (pure) positional scoring rules
that are not polynomially frequent. An example that stands
out is the Borda rule. This is left as an open direction for
future investigation that we have found quite challenging. For
the special case of Borda, we can prove the hardness ofNTW.
Theorem 5. NTW is coNP-complete for the Borda rule.
The proof, discussed next, is nontrivial and heavily relies
on the specific structure of this rule.
Proof of Theorem 5
We use the technique of circular voting blocks of Baumeister,
Roos and Jo¨rg [2011]. For a setA = {a1, . . . , at} and i ∈ [t],
the ith circular vote is
Mi(A) := (ai, ai+1, . . . , at, a1, a2, . . . , ai−1) .
We reduce from X3C as defined in the proof of Theorem 2.
Given an X3C instance (U,E) with U = {u1, . . . , u3q} and
E = {e1, . . . , em}, we construct an input (C,P,≻tie) for
NTW under Borda. The candidates are C = E ∪ D ∪ {c∗}
whereD = {d1, . . . , dm−1} and≻tie = O(E, {c
∗} , D). The
voting profile is the concatenation (union)P = P1 ◦T2 ◦T3
of the three parts described next.
First, P1 = (P 11 , . . . , P
1
3q). For every i ∈ [3q], only
edges that cover ui can receive a score of 2m − 1. Edges
that do not cover ui can receive at most m − 1, and c
∗ re-
ceives 0. Formally, denote by deg(ui) = |E(ui)| the degree
of ui in the graph and let D≤j = {d1, . . . , dj} and D>j =
{dj+1, . . . , dm−1}. We assume that 1 ≤ deg(ui) ≤ m − 1,
otherwise the problem is trivial. The partial order is P 1i =
P (E(ui), D≤m−deg(ui), D>m−deg(ui) ∪ (E \E(ui)), {c
∗}).
Note that for every e ∈ E \ E(ui), the number of candidates
ranked above e in Pi is |E(ui)|+m−deg(ui) = m, so indeed
it receives a score of at mostm− 1.
Second, T2 is composed of Scvr := 3(2m − 1) +
3
∑q−1
i=1 (m − i) copies of the profile (T
2
1 , . . . , T
2
m). For ev-
ery i ∈ [m] the order T 2i is constructed in the following
way. Start with Mi(E), then insert D and c
∗ such that the
score of c∗ is m and scores of ei, . . . , em, e1, . . . , ei−1 are
2m − 1, 2m − 3, . . . , 5, 3, 0 accordingly if m is even. If m
is odd then the scores of the edges are the same as before but
withm− 1 instead ofm and 1 instead of 0. Note that in both
cases, the sum of the scores of the edges is the same.
Finally, T3 consists of 4(3q + Scvr) copies of the profile
(T 31 , . . . , T
3
m+1). For this part only, denote em+1 = c
∗. For
every i ∈ [m+ 1], T 3i =Mi({e1, . . . , em+1}) ◦O(D).
We state some observations regarding the profile. In T2,
the score of c∗ is
s(T2, c∗) = Scvr · s((T
2
1 , . . . , T
2
m), c
∗) = Scvr ·m
2
For every e ∈ E, the score in T2 is
s(T2, e) = Scvr
m∑
i=2
(2i− 1) = Scvr
(
m2 − 1
)
= s(T 2, c∗)− Scvr .
In T3, for every d ∈ D, the score is
s(T3, d) ≤ 4(3q + Scvr)(m+ 1)(m− 2) ≤ 4m
2(3q + Scvr)
For every c ∈ C \D, the score in T3 is
s(T3, c) = 4(3q + Scvr)
m+1∑
i=1
(2m− i)
= 2(3q + Scvr)(3m
2 +m− 2) ≥ 6m2(3q + Scvr) .
Hence, for every pair d ∈ D, c ∈ C \ D it holds that
s(T3, c)−s(T3, d) ≥ 2m2(3q+Scvr). LetT = T
1◦T2◦T3
be a completion of P. For every pair d ∈ D, c ∈ C \ D,
the score in T1,T2 satisfy s(T1, d) − s(T1, c) < 6qm and
s(T2, d) − s(T2, c) < Scvr · 2m
2 (by the definition of the
Borda rule). Combining these two inequalities with what we
showed for T 3, we can deduce that s(T, c) − s(T, d) > 0,
which means that the candidates in C \ D always defeat all
candidates in D.
Claim 1. If there is an X3C, then c∗ is not a necessary top-q
winner.
Proof. Assume, w.l.o.g., that the exact cover is Q =
{e1, . . . , eq} and every edge in the cover is ei =
{i, q + i, 2q + i}. Define a completion T = T1 ◦ T2 ◦ T3,
T1 = (T 11 , . . . , T
1
n). In T
1, every edge in the cover ei ∈ Q
receives the following scores:
• ei gets 2m− 1 from T
1
i , T
1
q+i, T
1
2q+i, that is, ei is placed
at the top in the vertices which it covers.
• ei getsm− 1 from the vertices of ei+1, getsm− 2 from
the vertices of ei+2 and so on (when we reach eq we go
to e1 and continue until ei−1). Note that in this way there
is no vertex that should give the same score to two differ-
ent edges, and since q ≤ m the range of scores ei gets is
{m− 1,m− 2, . . . ,m− q + 1} ⊆ {m− 1, . . . , 1} as
required by the definition of P1.
For every edge e ∈ Q, the total score in T1 is s(T1, e) =
3(2m − 1) + 3
∑q−1
i=1 (m − i) = Scvr and recall that
s(T1, c∗) = 0. Combining this with what we already know
for T2 and T3 implies that
s(T, e)− s(T, c∗) = Scvr − Scvr + 0 = 0 .
All candidates in Q defeat c∗, hence c∗ is not a necessary
top-q winner.
Claim 2. If c∗ is not a necessary top-q-winner, then there is
an X3C.
Proof. LetT = T1 ◦T2 ◦T3 be a completion where at least
q candidates defeat c∗, let Q be the q highest rated candidates
in T . The candidate c∗ always defeats all candidates in D,
hence Q ⊆ E. We show a lower bound and an upper bound
on the total score of Q in T1.
Lower bound. As we already showed, every e ∈ Q should
get s(T1, e) ≥ Scvr in order to defeat c
∗, therefore
∑
e∈Q
s(T1, e) ≥ q · Scvr = 3q ·
(
2m− 1 +
q−1∑
i=1
(m− i)
)
= 3mq2 + 3mq −
3q3
2
+
3q2
2
− 3q
Upper bound. For every u ∈ U denote by degQ(u)
the degree of u in the sub-graph induced by Q, then∑
u∈U degQ(u) = 3q. We get that
∑
e∈Q
s(T1, e) ≤
3q∑
i=1

degQ(ui)∑
j=1
(2m− j) +
q−degQ(ui)∑
j=1
(m− j)


=3mq2 + 3mq −
3q3
2
+
3q2
2
−
3q∑
i=1
degQ(ui)
2 .
Overall, the two bounds imply that
∑3q
i=1 degQ(ui)
2 ≤ 3q
and this is possible only if all the degrees are one: When
all degrees are one, the sum is exactly 3q. If we decrease
degQ(ui) to zero and increase degQ(uj) to two, then the to-
tal sum increases by three. Any further changes cannot de-
crease the total sum. Therefore, all degrees in the sub-graphs
induced byQ are one, and Q is an X3C.
3.3 Top-k Sets
We have shown hardness results for the necessary and possi-
ble top-k winners. Interestingly, we can retain the tractable
cases of the necessary-winner and possible-winner problems
for the variant of the problem where we are given a set
C′ ⊆ C of k candidates, and the goal is to determine whether
C′ constitutes the exact set of top-k winners. We say that C′
is a necessary top-k set if C′ is the set of top-k winners in
every completion, and a possible top-k set if C′ is the set of
top-k winners in at least one completion.
Theorem 6. Let r be a positional scoring rule. We can de-
termine in time k · poly(n,m):
1. whether a given candidate set is a necessary top-k set;
2. whether a given candidate set is a possible top-k set,
assuming that r is either plurality or veto.
Proof. For the first part of Theorem 6 (necessity), we only
need to determine whether a candidate outside of C′ can de-
feat a candidate from C′. This can be done using the algo-
rithm of Xia and Conitzer [2011], with a minor adjustment to
account for tie breaking.
For the second part (possibility), for every candidate c′ ∈
C′ and every integer score 0 ≤ s ≤ n we use Lemma 5 (that
we prove in the following section) to check if there exists a
completionT which satisfies the following conditions. First,
s(T, c′) = s. Second, for every c ∈ C′ \ {c′}, if c≻tie c
′
then s(T, c) ≥ s, otherwise s(T, c) > s. This means that
all candidates in C′ \ {c′} defeat c′. Finally, For every c ∈
C \ C′, if c′≻tie c then s(T, c) ≤ s, otherwise s(T, c) < s.
This means that c′ defeats all candidates in C \ C′. C′ is a
possible top-k set if and only if such completion exists for
some candidate c′ ∈ C′ and score s.
Interestingly, for the plurality and veto rules, a set C′ of
candidates is a top-k set for at least one tie-breaking order
if and only if C′ is a Condorcet committee [Fishburn, 1981].
Then, by a simple adjustment of the proof of Theorem 6 we
can conclude that, in the case of plurality and veto, one can
determine in polynomial time whether a given candidate set
is a necessary or possible Condorcet committee.
4 The Case of a Fixed k
In the previous section, we established that the problems of
finding the necessary and possible top-k winners are very of-
ten intractable. In this section, we investigate the complexity
of these problems under the assumption that k is fixed (and,
in particular, can be the degree of the polynomial that bounds
the running time). We will show that the complexity picture
for NTW〈k〉 and PTW〈k〉 is way more positive, as we gen-
eralize the tractability of almost all of the tractable scoring
rules for NW and PW. We will also generalize hardness re-
sults from PW to PTW〈k〉; interestingly, this generalization
turns out to be quite nontrivial.
4.1 Tractabiliy of NTW〈k〉
We first prove that NTW〈k〉 is tractable for every positional
scoring rule (pure or not), as long as the scores are bounded
by a polynomial in the numberm of candidates; in this case,
we say that the rule has polynomial scores. Note that this as-
sumption is in addition to our usual assumption that the scores
can be computed in polynomial time.
Theorem 7. For all fixed k and positional scoring rules r
with polynomial scores, NTW〈k〉 is in polynomial time.
Note that all of the specific rules mentioned so far (i.e., t-
approval, t-veto, Borda and so on) have polynomial scores,
and hence, are covered by Theorem 7. An example of a rule
that is not covered is the rule defined by r(m, j) = 2m−j .
In the remainder of this section, we prove Theorem 7. To
determine whether a candidate c is a necessary top-k winner,
we search for a counterexample, that is, k candidates that de-
feat c in some completion. For that, we iterate over every
subset {c1, . . . , ck} ⊆ C \ {c} and determine whether these
k + 1 candidates can get a combination of scores that con-
stitues the counterexample.
More formally, let C be a set of candidates and r a posi-
tional scoring rule. For a partial profile P = (P1, . . . , Pn)
and a sequence S = (c1, . . . , cq) of candidates from C, we
denote by π(P, S) the set of all possible scores that the can-
didates in S can obtain jointly in a completion:
π(P, S) := {(s(T, c1), . . . , s(T, cq)) : T completesP}
Note that π(P, S) ⊆ {0, . . . , n · ~sm(1)}
q
. When P consists
of a single voter P , we write π(P, S) instead of π(P, S).
A counterexample for c being a necessary top-k winner is a
sequence S = (c1, . . . , cq) where q = k + 1 and cq = c, and
a sequence (s1, . . . , sq) ∈ π(P, S) such that each ci beats
c when for i = 1, . . . , k the score of ci is s(ci) = si and
s(c) = sq. The following two lemmas show that, indeed, we
can find such a counterexample in polynomial time.
Lemma 3. Let q be a fixed number and r a positional scoring
rule. Whether (s1, . . . , sq) ∈ π(P, S) can be determined in
polynomial time, given a partial order P over a set of candi-
dates, a sequence S of q candidates, and scores s1, . . . , sq.
Proof. We use a reduction to a scheduling problem where
tasks have execution times, release times, deadlines, and
precedence constraints (i.e., task x should be completed be-
fore starting task y). This scheduling problem can be solved
in polynomial time [Garey et al., 1981]. In the reduction,
each candidate c is a task with a unit execution time. For ev-
ery ci in S, the release time is min {j ∈ [n] : r(m, j) = si},
and the deadline is 1+max{j ∈ [n] : r(m, j) = si}. For the
rest of the candidates, the release time is 1 and the deadline
is m + 1. The precedence constraints are P . It holds that
(s1, . . . , sq) ∈ π(P, S) if and only if the tasks can be sched-
uled according to all the requirements.
From Lemma 3 we can conclude that when q is fixed and r
has polynomial scores, we can construct π(P, S) in polyno-
mial time, via straightforward dynamic programming.
Lemma 4. Let q be a fixed natural number and r a positional
scoring rule with polynomial scores. The set π(P, S) can be
constructed in polynomial time, given a partial profile P and
a sequence S of q candidates.
Proof. First, for every i ∈ [n], construct π(Pi, S) using
Lemma 3. Then, given π((P1, . . . , Pi), S), observe that
π((P1, . . . , Pi+1), S)
= {~u+ ~w : ~u ∈ π((P1, . . . , Pi), S), ~w ∈ π(Pi+1, S)}
where ~u + ~w is a point-wise sum of the two vectors (~u +
~w)(j) = ~u(j) + ~w(j). Hence, π(P, S) can be constructed
via straightforward dynamic programming.
4.2 Complexity of PTW〈k〉
Plurality and Veto
We first show that the positional scoring rules that are
tractable for PW, namely plurality and veto, are also tractable
for PTW〈k〉. This is done by a reduction to the problem of
polygamous matching [Kimelfeld et al., 2019]: Given a bi-
partite graphG = (U ∪W,E) and natural numbersαw ≤ βw
for all w ∈ W , determine whether there is a subset of E
where each u ∈ U is incident to exactly one edge and ev-
ery w ∈ W is incident to at least αw edges and at most βw
edges. This problem is known to be solvable in polynomial
time [Shiloach, 1981; Edmonds and Johnson, 2001].
Lemma 5. The following decision problem can be solved
in polynomial time for the plurality and veto rules: given
a partial profile P over a set C of candidates and numbers
γc ≤ δc for every candidate c, is there a completion T such
that γc ≤ s(T, c) ≤ δc for every c ∈ C?
Proof. For both rules, we apply a reduction to polygamous
matching, where U = V (the set of voters) andW = C. For
plurality, E connects vi ∈ V and c ∈ C whenever c can be
in the top position in one or more completions of Pi, and the
bounds are αc = γc and βc = δc. For veto, receiving a score
s is equivalent to being placed in the bottom position of n− s
voters, so E connects vi ∈ V and c ∈ C whenever c can be
in the bottom position in one or more completions of Pi. The
bounds are αc = n− δc and βc = n− γc.
Finally, to solve PTW〈k〉 given C, P, ≻tie and c, we con-
sider every set D ⊆ C \ {c} of size m − k and search for a
completion where c defeats all candidates of D. For that,
we iterate over every integer score 0 ≤ s ≤ n and use
Lemma 5 to test whether there exists a completion T such
that s(T, c) ≥ s, and for every d ∈ D we have s(T, d) ≤ s if
c≻tie d or s(T, d) < s otherwise. Hence, we conclude that:
Theorem 8. For every fixed k, PTW〈k〉 can be solved in
polynomial under the plurality and veto rules.
The polynomial degree in Theorem 8 depends on k. This is
unavoidable, at least for the plurality rule, under conventional
assumptions in parameterized complexity. This is shown by
the proof of Theorem 2 that gives an FPT reduction from the
dominating-set problem, which isW[2]-hard, to PTW.
Theorem 9. Under the plurality rule, PTW isW[2]-hard for
the parameter k.
Beyond Plurality and Veto
The Classification Theorem (Theorem 1) states that PW is
intractable for every pure scoring rule other than plurality or
veto. While this hardness easily generalizes to PTW〈k〉 for
k = 1, it is not at all clear how to generalize it to any k > 1.
In particular, we cannot see how to reduce PW to PTW〈k〉
while assuming only the purity of the rule. We can, however,
show such a reduction under a stronger notion of purity.
A rule r is strongly pure if the score sequence for m + 1
candidates is obtained from the score sequence for m candi-
dates by inserting a new score, either to beginning or the end
of the sequence. More formally, r = {~sm}m∈N+ is strongly
pure if for all m ≥ 1, either ~sm+1 = ~sm+1(1) ◦ ~sm or
~sm+1 = ~sm ◦ ~sm+1(m + 1). Note that t-approval, t-veto
and Borda are all strongly pure.
Theorem 10. Suppose that the positional scoring rule is
strongly pure, has polynomial scores, and is neither plural-
ity nor veto. Then PTW〈k〉 is NP-complete for all fixed k.
Proof. Let r be a positional scoring rule that satisfies the con-
ditions of the theorem, and let us denote r by {~sm}m>1. We
use a reduction from PW under r. Consider the input P and
c for PW over a set C ofm candidates. Letm′ = m+ k− 1.
Since r is strongly pure, there is an index t ≤ k− 1 such that
~sm′ =(~sm′(1), . . . , ~sm′(t)) ◦ ~sm
◦ (~sm′(t+m+ 1), . . . , ~sm′(m
′)) .
scores M1,1 · · · M1,m′ · · · Mk−1,1 · · · Mk−1,m′
r′(1) d1 d1 dk−1 dk−1
r′(2) d2 d2 d1 d1
...
...
...
...
...
r′(k − 1) dk−1 dk−1 dk−2 dk−2
r′(k) c1 cm′ c1 cm′
r′(k + 1) c2 c1 c2 c1
...
...
...
...
...
r′(m′) cm′ cm′−1 cm′ cm′−1
Figure 1: The voters Mi,j used in the proof of Theorem 10 with
r′(j) as a shorthand notation for r(m′, j)
That is, ~sm′ is obtained from ~sm by inserting t values at the
top coordinates and k−1−t values at the bottom coordinates.
We define C′, P′ and ≻′
tie
as follows.
• C′ = C ∪D1∪D2 whereD1 = {d1, . . . , dt} andD2 =
{dt+1, . . . , dk−1}. DenoteD = D1 ∪D2.
• P′ is the concatenation Q ◦ M of two partial profiles.
The first isQ = (Q1, . . . , Qn), whereQi is the same as
Pi, except that the candidates ofD1 are placed at the top
positions and the candidates ofD2 are placed at the bot-
tom positions. Formally,Qi := Pi∪P (D1, C,D2). The
second,M, consists of n · ~sm′(1) copies of the profile
{Mi,j}i=1,...,k−1 , j=1,...,m
where Mi,j is Mi(D) ◦ Mj(C) for the circular votes
Mi(D) andMj(C) as defined in the proof of Theorem 5.
• ≻′
tie
= O(D, {c} , C \ {c}).
We show that the candidates of D always defeat all other
candidates. For every d ∈ D, the score of d in M is
s(M, d) = n ·~sm′(1) ·m
∑k−1
i=1 ~sm′(i), and for every c
′ ∈ C
the score inM is
s(M, c′) = n · ~sm′(1) · (k − 1)
m′∑
i=k
~sm′(i) ≤
n · ~sm′(1) ·
(
m
k−1∑
i=1
~sm′(i)− 1
)
= s(M, d)− n · ~sm′(1)
where the inequality is due to the assumption that ~sm′(1) >
~sm′(m
′). LetT′ be a completion of P′, we get that
s(T′, c′) ≤ n · ~sm′(1) + s(M, c
′)
≤ ~sm′(1) + s(M, d)− n · ~sm′(1) ≤ s(T
′, d) .
Since the candidates ofD are the first candidates in≻′
tie
, they
always defeat the candidates of C.
We show that c is a possible winner for P if and only
if c is a possible top-k winner for (C′,P′,≻′
tie
). Let T =
(T1, . . . Tn) be a completion of P where c is a winner. Con-
sider the completion T′ = (T ′1, . . . T
′
n) ◦ M of P
′ where
T ′i = O(D1) ◦ Ti ◦ O(D2). For every c
′ ∈ C, we know that
s(T′, d) ≥ s(T′, c′) for every d ∈ D, and from the property
of ~sm′ we get that
s(T′, c′) = s(T, c′) + n · ~sm′(1) ·
m′∑
i=k
~sm′(i) .
From the choice of ≻′
tie
, c defeats all candidates of C \ {c}
in T′, hence c′ is a top-k winner in T′. Conversely, let T′ =
(T ′1, . . . T
′
n) ◦ M be a completion of P
′ where c is a top-k
winner, define a completion T of P by removingD from all
orders in (T ′1, . . . T
′
n). For every c
′ ∈ C we have
s(T, c′) = s(T′, c′)− n · ~sm′(1) ·
m′∑
i=k
~sm′(i)
hence c is a winner in T.
The proof of Theorem 10 can be easily adjusted to show
the hardness of determining whether a given candidate set of
the fixed size k is a top-k set.
Theorem 11. Suppose that the positional scoring rule is
strongly pure, has polynomial scores, and is neither plurality
nor veto. Then for every fixed k it is NP-complete to decide
whether a given candidate set is a possible top-k set.
5 Concluding Remarks
We studied the problems of detecting the necessary and pos-
sible top-k winners over incomplete voting profiles. We
showed that these problems are fundamentally harder than
their classic top-1 counterparts (necessary and possible win-
ners) when k is given as part of the input. For a fixed k,
we have generally recovered the tractable positional scoring
rules of the top-1 variant. Many problems are left for inves-
tigation in future research: completing our results towards
full classifications (of the class of pure rules), establishing
useful tractability conditions for an input k, further investi-
gating the parameterized complexity of the problem when k
is the parameter, detecting the necessary and possible com-
mittee members under different committee-selection policies,
and incorporating fairness and diversity constraints.
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